Backward to utopia! |
For
16 days this month, conservatives in Congress deliberately
shut down the federal government and threatened to default on the national
debt, thereby destroying
the world economy, in an attempt to force Democrats to repeal Obamacare and
accede to their
entire economic agenda. How do
conservatives justify such shockingly
irresponsible and ruthless tactics?
There are three basic defenses they give and, like so much of American
discourse, they revolve around the question of the proper relationship between
the citizenry and the political elite.
That is, who really represents the people?
Conservatives
loudly answer, “We do!” In the first defense of their tactical
radicalism conservatives claim to represent a majority of American opinion, a
majority that hates Obamacare, big government and the size
of the federal debt. Call this the populist defense. Conservatives represent the people against a
governing elite that has become an unresponsive ruling class,
a technocratic, snobbish, culturally alien aristocracy, imposing heavy
regulations and stiff taxes on a public it disdains, while exempting
its cronies and contributors. In this
view the American people are noble and the government, captive to special
interests, fails to channel that nobility.
Obamacare is merely the most recent and most egregious liberal imposition. In fact, it’s so onerous and so indicative of
the further
horrors waiting to leap out of the liberal imagination onto the backs of
the American people that anything is justified in trying to stop it.
But the populist defense just fails. Public opinion polls do show a majority
opposed to Obamacare, but it’s a slim majority, and a sizeable part of the
opposition comes from
the left, from those who wish the government was more involved in health care, either through
a public option or a single payer plan.
Also, individual parts of the law are quite popular. Most Americans do agree in theory that both
the federal
government and the federal
debt are too big. But those
anti-government convictions evaporate in the harsh sun of majority support for
particular government programs like Social Security and Medicare, programs so
popular that most Americans would rather
raise taxes than modify them or reduce their benefits. The 2012 Republican candidate for president promised
to cancel Obamacare on his first day in office; he lost decisively. Democrats retained control of the Senate, and
Republicans lost
the national popular vote for the House of Representatives (but held the
House because of misrepresentative
districting). And most importantly,
most Americans explicitly
condemn the confrontational tactics conservative have employed. The majority supports neither conservative
ends nor conservative means. Indeed, conservatives
know this all too well; it was recognition of public disfavor that convinced
GOP leaders to surrender.
The second conservative defense is
less easily dismissed. It admits that
conservatives are a minority (albeit a sizeable one) and that conservatives did
in fact lose last year’s elections. But,
it demands relief from the impositions of big government – Obamacare in
particular – on the basis of respect for minority rights. Call this the libertarian defense.
Conservatives bravely stand for the principle that no one, conservative
or otherwise, should be coerced with individual mandates, excessive
regulations, high taxes, or any other unwelcome control from the government,
even a majority controlled one. John Hayward
of RedState.com (his italics):
The only way to prevent power from building
to a dangerously explosive pressure is to install a relief valve in the
political system: the right of meaningful
dissent, which means the right of refusal.
The majority wants to do something I disagree with? Fine, knock yourselves out. Let me know how it goes. You might even persuade me to get on board,
one of these days.
The populist defense claims that
the people want to be left
alone. The libertarian defense claims
they have a right to be left alone. In the libertarian view the American people
are something of a menace, a thoughtless mob using the blunt instrument of the
federal government to oppress resistant minorities. Government fails because it’s too expansive;
it interferes and intrudes more than it should, much more, definitely, than the
Founders wished, more than the Constitution allows. The Constitution was explicitly created to
preclude modern liberal paternalism and conservatives are therefore permitted
to override it (for example, by putting
the national credit in question or enforcing Senatorial
supermajorities) in order to protect it.
They’re also justified in generously
amending it to return it to its original purpose of outlawing modern liberalism. Radicalism in the service of tradition seems
to be a way of life for this crop of conservatives.
Does the Constitution prohibit the
welfare/regulatory state? This is much
too big a question for this small essay, but decades of Supreme Court
decisions, going back to 1937, answer
in the negative. Even Obamacare’s
mandate that individuals purchase health insurance under threat of a tax
penalty has been deemed constitutional
by a conservative
Supreme Court presided over by a conservative
Chief Justice. The libertarian
principle, that there are individual rights which no legislature may infringe,
is a vitally important principle, one which we violate at our peril. But it’s not obvious that one shouldn’t be
coerced into supporting a health insurance system that sooner or later one will
come to rely upon. Everyone pays taxes
for public schools, even people without children. The libertarian defense is not an obvious
sham like the populist defense, but unless one is an anarchist absolutist who
believes no coercion is ever justified, it’s not so self-evidently compelling
as to justify the radical confrontationalism of early October.
The third conservative defense is
similar to the populist defense, in that it sees Obamacare as the imposition of
a non-representative ruling class, but it makes no pretense of speaking for a
majority. It charges that Obamacare
lacks moral legitimacy because of how
it was passed. For one thing, it was
passed without any Republican votes; as noted conservative writer Charles
Krauthammer puts it:
From Social
Security to civil rights to Medicaid to Medicare, never in the modern history
of the country has major social legislation been enacted on a straight
party-line vote. Never.
And it was passed through
non-standard legislative procedures, using budgetary rules to avoid a
Republican filibuster. Red State
columnist Daniel
Horowitz wrote on October 4th:
Obamacare was passed through budget
reconciliation. So when they felt it was
convenient for them to inject Obamacare into the budget process; namely, for
the purpose of avoiding the 60-vote threshold, they were more than happy to do
so. Well, what’s good for the goose is
good for the gander. Now that we have
approached the implementation date, which coincides with the budget deadline,
it’s time to use that same process to uproot a law that is unworkable and
unpopular.
When in the middle of the 2010 Congressional
healthcare debate, the very blue state of Massachusetts sent a Republican to the
Senate expressly
to stop Obamacare, Democrats overrode this “unmistakable message of popular
opposition.” Democrats started this game
of flouting legislative and democratic norms; when Republicans play grand obstructionists
they are just responding in kind. Call
this the hardball defense. In the hardball view the parties are ruthless
gangs and the American people are the turf they fight over. (The hardball defense, of course, does
nothing to defend the conservative debt ceiling demand to enact their entire
economic program; it can, at best, justify extraordinary measures only for
stopping Obamacare itself.) To
Krauthammer, Democratic legislative chicanery was so dismissive of dissident
views and so ruthless in its determination that it more that justifies the
angry, combative Tea Party response it provoked:
It’s the
Democrats who gave life to a spontaneous, authentic, small-government
opposition — a.k.a. the tea party — with their unilateral imposition of a transformational
agenda during the brief interval when they held a monopoly of power. That interval is over. The current unrest is
the residue of that hubris.
The
hardball defense, in effect, accuses Democrats of acting like Leninists. Yes, Leninists; but in a particular way. Vladimir Lenin redirected Russian Marxism from
a broad-based, democratic, trade union movement into a small, dedicated,
aggressive vanguard party which alone perceived and expressed true proletarian
class consciousness. He believed the
workers as a whole could never fully grasp their objective situation and could
not become the basis of the coming socialist utopia without the strict direction
of such a vanguard. Lenin’s primary
contribution to political theory is the notion that an ideologically enlightened
cadre can understand and represent the people better than they can
themselves. And when an unlikely
procession of historical events led to the October 1917 Bolshevik Revolution
and the raising of the red flag over
St. Petersburg, Lenin used that seizure of state power to impose a Communist
transformation upon an unwilling society.
What Krauthammer, Horowitz, etc. are saying is that modern liberals feel
justified in imposing Obamacare and other big government social programs
because they believe they understand the economic interests of working people
better than those working people themselves.
The Democrats won complete control of the federal government in 2009 and
2010 only because of the unlikely combination of revulsion against the outgoing
Republican president plus the celebratory appeal of a black presidential
candidate plus a terrible financial collapse; they used that power to force
their centrally-controlled medical insurance scheme upon a people who’d made it
clear they didn’t want it. Liberals are
convinced, because of their technocratic arrogance and their over-educated sanctimony,
of their right to act in the interests of the little people.
Of the three defenses, this is the
only compelling one. After all, Democratic
criticism of recent Republican brinksmanship is procedural; no one disputes their right to oppose Obamacare or
negotiate over the budget, only whether they should do so by shutting down the
government or threatening a default. And
Democratic procedures for enacting Obamacare would not make a shining example
for a civics textbook. But neither were they
as unsavory as conservatives portray. Obamacare
was one of the main planks of Obama’s 2008 election platform, an election he
won by a substantial 7 point margin.
That same year, Democrats increased their Senate majority to 59
out of 100 seats and their House
majority to 257 out 435 seats (having received 56% of the vote). After passing economic stimulus in February
of 2009, Democrats turned to healthcare. And Krauthammer
dismisses the notion that Democrats genuinely tried to be bipartisan about it:
The Democrats
insist they welcomed contributing ideas from Republicans. Rubbish. Republicans
proposed that insurance be purchasable across state lines. They got nothing.
They sought serious tort reform. They got nothing.
But failure to include two (seriously
flawed) policy proposals does not constitute Leninism. Democrats spent months negotiating with more
tractable Republicans Senators like Mike Enzi, Charles Grassley, Orrin Hatch
and Olympia Snowe, trying to get
them on board by suggesting less generous and more market-centered plans. Many
Democrats, possibly
including Obama, might have preferred Medicare for all, but they refrained
from pushing that because of resistance from within their own caucus (not much
of a Leninist monolith there), even though single payer has garnered majority
support in some
polls. And yes, only Democrats voted
for Obamacare, but that was because Republicans boycotted it as part of a deliberate
political ploy to deny
it bipartisan legitimacy. They did negotiate with Democrats at first, but it’s
hard not to conclude they did so in simple bad faith with the deliberate
intention of delaying the bill’s passage in order to discredit it in the
public mind. Historically, major social
legislation won support in both parties because historically the parties were
not ideologically consistent. Before the
great post-60’s political realignment there were liberals and conservatives in
both parties. Consider Krauthammer’s list
of major social legislation: Social Security, Civil Rights, Medicare,
Medicaid. He seems to celebrate them, but
he neglects one very interesting point: they were all liberal initiatives that
are tremendously popular now that were strenuously opposed by conservatives at
the time. Indeed, opposition to such
initiatives was what defined them as conservative! In 1961 Ronald Reagan, then a famous actor
and aspiring conservative activist, famously predicted the enactment of Medicare
would mean the
death of freedom, a stance that might deepen the confusion of present-day Tea
Partiers holding signs reading “Keep government out of my Medicare!” If liberals waited for conservative support
no important social legislation would ever be passed.
And why should Democrats have been
forced to reach Horowitz’s 60 vote threshold?
He’s referring to the filibuster,
a Senate rule which requires 60 or more Senators to allow a bill to come to a vote. (Forgive the following short walk through the
weeds of legislative process, but it’s necessary to clarify a point important
enough that Tea Partiers claim it justifies their aggressive tactics.) Historically the filibuster was invoked infrequently,
but after 2000 it began to be used more and more until now it has almost come
to be considered part of the normal functioning of the Senate. This violates the spirit (if not the letter)
of the Constitution, which demands super-majorities for specific votes (such as
ratification of foreign treaties) and requires nothing more than simple
majorities for most votes. The Democrats
had 60 votes after the defection of Arlen Specter in April of
2009 and passed their version of Obamacare in the Senate in December. But they lost the 60th vote on
January 19, 2010 when Republican Scott Brown won the special election to fill
the seat emptied by the death of Ted Kennedy, the liberal lion. Brown had indeed campaigned with the promise
of maintaining the filibuster against Obamacare and thereby preventing its passage. The House of Representatives had passed its
own version in November, but Brown’s election and promise of filibuster
meant the House and Senate bills could not be negotiated through normal
procedure. Democrats, determined to pass
universal health care after decades of effort, decided the House would simply pass
the Senate bill as it was and make any desired changes through supplementary
legislation passed in the Senate via the budget reconciliation process, which
doesn’t require 60 votes. It’s only the
passing of this smaller
accompanying act (which contained only budgetary changes to the main bill)
that Horowitz is complaining about, not the passage of Obamacare itself. If conservatives were justified in using an
extra-Constitutional device like the filibuster to block Obamacare in a
repudiation of huge Democratic electoral victories, why were Democrats so
unjustified in using budget reconciliation to pass minor changes?
There’s a word for ruthlessly
using technicalities to win on policy: hardball. But hardball is not the same as Leninism. On the other hand, parties tend to employ
hardball when they lack broad popular support.
Was that true of Democrats and Obamacare? The Democrats had won the presidency and
large majorities in both houses of Congress by running on – among other things
– universal healthcare. But wait: “among
other things.” People vote for all sorts
of reasons and not everyone that voted Democrat did so to enact Obamacare;
though, by the same token, probably not everyone who voted Republican did so to
block it. If there was overwhelming
popular support for Obamacare – as there had been for Social Security,
Medicare, etc. – it would have been quite hard for Republican members of
Congress to vote against it. The final
Senate version passed in the House by only 219 to 212; 34 Democrats voted no,
hardly an overwhelming acclamation. This
is where Krauthammer’s charge of Democratic partisanship has some validity.
The last decades have seen increasing
polarization, and a relatively small majority supported universal
healthcare while a sizeable minority vehemently opposed it. Democrats did try to mollify that
polarization by modeling
their healthcare legislation upon moderate
proposals by the two most important conservative think tanks, the Heritage
Foundation and the American Enterprise Institute, and touted by Newt
Gingrich and other Congressional conservatives, and passed into law by the Republican
governor of Massachusetts.
Conservatives responded with legislative stonewalling, some even conceding
that they had never
seriously meant their own proposals but only pretended so to undercut
liberal plans. Indeed, over the course
of the healthcare debate, liberals reached out to conservatives and were repeatedly
rebuffed. Most of that rebuff was
political and cynical – more hardball – but some of it was based upon honest
differences over the role of government in a free society. That is, by 2009 polarization had grown to
the point that, reasonably or not, conservatives honestly wanted
no universal healthcare to
pass. When the Democrats passed genuinely
contentious legislation in such a polarized atmosphere and through such
unorthodox methods it was bound to exacerbate polarization and partisan bitterness. It’s true that much of that polarization
before the passage of Obamacare was part of a deliberate
conservative strategy designed to
increase polarization, but Democrats need not have responded in kind. Hardball against your opponents may be
appropriate revenge for the hardball you’ve endured, but, contra Krauthammer, Leninism
as retribution for Leninism is not so glibly justified. And when Democrats used hardball to overcome
lack of popular support it was a genuine example of the Leninist attitude. But the most objectionable example of
Democratic Leninism was the dismissal of Scott Brown’s election. When such a blue state replaced its longtime
very liberal Senator with a Republican expressly for the purpose of blocking
Democratic legislation, it constituted an unmistakable loss of popular
confidence. When Democrats determined to
pass Obamacare anyway it expressed greater trust in its own ideological analysis
than in public opinion.
But
Republicans have been guilty of the Leninist attitude as well, and more
systematically and to a greater degree. George W. Bush acquired the presidency with
less than 48% of the popular vote, but he governed as if
he’d won a broad conservative mandate.
From the Bush era to the present, conservatives have consistently pushed
for upper end tax cuts, claiming to represent widespread populist demand for
them; there
isn’t any. Even during the Great Recession, conservatives have anguished
over the debt in the name of a public that is actually much more concerned about jobs. But the real problem of conservative Leninism
is that it’s baked right into the cake of conservative populism. Consider again the conservative defenses of this
month’s confrontationalism. The populist
defense claims conservatives represent a majority when they clearly don’t. Seems like everyday political deceit; but is
there something more? The libertarian
defense claims, in effect, that conservatives should be exempt from certain
government actions, even those democratically passed and duly adjudicated. And as we saw, hardball tactics typically
indicate lack of popular support, and October’s hardball conservatism seems to
lack all scruples about thwarting popular will.
Do conservatives feel themselves in possession of some alternative to a
numerical majority that conveys comparable, or even superior, authority?
It’s a mainstay of conservative
folklore that Republicans loose presidential elections when they nominate mushy
moderates, like John McCain and Mitt Romney, and win with full-fledged,
reliable conservatives, like Ronald Reagan (he may constitute that entire
list). They really seem to believe,
against all
evidence, that the American heart belongs to them and can be made to beat
vibrantly again at the entreaties of a true-blue conservative savior-statesman. That is, conservatives believe they
understand the American essence in a way non-conservatives just cannot. Only they appreciate the almost perfect
constellation of cultural and political institutions – a free market, a
religious and temperate populace, and divided and limited government – bequeathed
by the Founders; and only they feel the appropriate urgency of freeing
ourselves of liberal corruption and returning to that original bliss. That’s what it means to be conservative! This
inside knowledge of the true American cultural essence is what endows
conservatives with the moral-political authority to override mere numerical majorities. This is conservative
cultural Leninism: the belief that all true Americans are conservative
beneath the skin, and if not, then they aren’t true Americans and they’re views
need not be respected. This attitude is widespread,
habitual and fundamental on the American right.
And it’s this minority populist arrogance which is the true
justification for the shockingly hardball conservative strategy of shutdown and
debt threat, a strategy that constitutes the single most egregious act of Leninism
in generations.
All
political movements, even democratic ones, must have leaders and experts; in a
word: elites. There are subtle and
complex issues that much of the public – actually living private lives detached
from the inside baseball of modern government – simply doesn’t appreciate. Consider that the citizenry wishes to not
raise the debt ceiling. They are
correct in thinking that raising it allows the government to acquire more debt,
but they don’t seem to understand that it allows the government to acquire more
debt in order to pay for government spending that Congress and the president have
already agreed upon and are legally committed to spend. Failure to raise it would prevent the
government from paying its already existing debts, which the world financial
system rests
upon; such failure would likely lead to global
economic Armageddon. This is a
simple matter of fact upon which the public is simply wrong. Congressmen, Federal Reserve governors,
department heads, news professionals, academics, advisors and bureaucrats understand
this issue in ways that much of the public does not and probably never
will. That’s not a slam against
anyone. The American people generally
display reasonable and balanced judgment; they have good instincts. Consider their reaction to recent Republican
extremist tactics. But it’s not the job
of private citizens to be informed on every aspect of fiscal policy. Responsible, informed, prudent elites are as
necessary to a functioning democracy as is a free and responsible populace.
Of course, not all elites are
responsible. During the debate over
Obamacare, Republicans filled the public discourse will all sorts of dishonest
accusations:
death panels, socialized medicine, government takeover, etc.; such
lies continue now in the implementation phase. The public, with its own
ideological inclinations and its less-than-perfect knowledge of the issues can
be too susceptible to propaganda and obfuscation. That susceptibility helps explain much of the
change in opinion on healthcare between Obama’s election and Scott Brown’s. This is one of the inescapable limitations of
democracy. (Sometimes the elite falls
prey to its own propaganda: apparently several Republican Congressmen seem to
think a default
would actually be beneficial! But
what’s forgivable in the general public is unbearably shameful in a public
servant.)
Acknowledging the people’s
imperfections opens one up to the very charge of Leninism, a charge that can be
quite powerful in a country with such a deep populist tradition. Such accusations arise, for example, whenever
a party tries to explain its own electoral failure. In a democracy you’re obligated to believe
that your side loses (either from messaging failure, but that’s the lamest
copout there is, or) out of ignorance; i.e. the people don’t realize how
wrong they are. Conservatives believe
people vote liberal for the free
government goodies; they are morally weak and don’t appreciate the moral satisfaction
of economic independence and personal responsibility. Liberals believe people vote conservative out
of mistaken beliefs about the moral
nature of capitalist outcomes. They believe
that big government humanizes capitalism and makes it work for everyone rather
than just the rich; when working people vote against liberalism it must be that
devious conservatives are manipulating their cultural and racial fears. Obama famously
said in 2008 (in a closed-door meeting) that when working people feel the
economic squeeze, “it’s not surprising then they get bitter, they cling to guns
or religion or antipathy toward people who aren't like them or anti-immigrant
sentiment or anti-trade sentiment as a way to explain their frustrations.” But Leninism does not consist in believing
the people are mistaken or limited; it consists in believing one is justified,
based upon one’s possession of special ideological truth, to act on important
issues against the public’s clear wishes.
Democracy is necessary because without accountability elites run the
system for their own benefit. If democracy
without elites becomes a mob ripe for demagoguery, elites without popular
control become an aristocracy. Leninism
is an alibi for an aspiring aristocracy.
But even liberals at their
Leninist worst, as when passing unpopular transformational legislation, or conservatives
at their even worse Leninist worst, as when threatening to blow up the world
economy unless their losing economic agenda is enacted in full, are radically
different from historical Marxist-Leninists in one very important way: neither
one is a small, purely intellectual movement.
Both liberalism and conservatism are broad-based popular movements. Both the Democratic and Republican parties
are small “d” democratic parties in that the grass roots of each party has
enormous influence over its policy.
Indeed, the Republican establishment and business leaders lament how
powerful the Tea Party insurgency has become within the GOP. The actual Lenin led his vanguard party to
violent revolution and totalitarian control and no reasonable person fears
those things in America
in the foreseeable future. But the
Leninist attitude is a serious threat to national comity and unity; it
exacerbates polarization; it makes people angry; it robs them of their
pragmatism and generosity; it makes them less receptive to reason and
compromise and more susceptible to propaganda and demagoguery. And there is one other very important and
quite fortunate difference between Lenin’s red October of 1917 and the red
state Tea Party insurrection we just endured:
Our red October failed. Thank
goodness. And thank the good sense of
the America
people.